

MGT 621 – MICROECONOMICS

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8. *General Equilibrium, Part I*

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AGENDA

General Equilibrium: The Standard Model

Pure Exchange

Production Economies

Key Concepts to Remember

THE STANDARD MODEL

Basic Assumptions:

- N **goods**, $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$
- C **consumers**, $c \in \{1, \dots, C\}$
 - Each consumer c has a **rational** (i.e., complete and transitive) **preference ordering** over \mathfrak{R}_+^N representable by a **continuous utility function** $u_c : \mathfrak{R}_+^N \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$. Consumers are **price takers**
- F **firms**, $f \in \{1, \dots, F\}$
 - Each firm f has a **production set** $Y_f \subset \mathfrak{R}^N$
 - **Nonempty and closed**
 - **No free lunch** ($Y_f \cap \mathfrak{R}_+^N \subset \{0\}$; can't produce something from nothing)
 - **Possibility of inaction** ($0 \in Y_f$)
 - **Free disposal** ($Y_f - \mathfrak{R}_+^N \subset Y_f$)
 - **Irreversibility** ($y \in Y_f \setminus \{0\} \Rightarrow -y \notin Y_f$)
- **Initial endowments**: each consumer c starts with an endowment vector $\omega^c \in \mathfrak{R}_+^N$ and a fractional share distribution $\theta^c = (\theta_1^c, \dots, \theta_F^c)$, where $\theta_f^c \in [0, 1]$ for each firm f with

$$\sum_{c=1}^C \theta_f^c = 1 \quad (\text{Private Ownership Economy})$$

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WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM

Definition: A **Walrasian equilibrium (WE)** is a specification of a **price vector** $p \in \mathfrak{R}_+^N$, a **demand vector** $x^c \in \mathfrak{R}_+^N$ for each consumer c , and a **supply vector** $y^f \in Y_f$ for each firm f , such that

- **profit maximization**, i.e., $y^f \in \arg \max_{y \in Y_f} p \cdot y$
- **utility maximization**, i.e., $x^c \in \arg \max_{x \in B(p, I^c)} u_c(x)$

where **consumer c 's budget set** is given by $B_c = B(p, I^c) = \{x \in \mathfrak{R}_+^N : p \cdot x \leq I^c\}$

with **total income** $I^c = p \cdot \omega^c + \sum_{f=1}^F \theta_f^c (p \cdot y^f)$

- **demand = supply**, $\sum_{c=1}^C x^c = \sum_{c=1}^C \omega^c + \sum_{f=1}^F y^f$ (i.e., **allocation is feasible**)

hold.

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PURE EXCHANGE IS A SPECIAL CASE OF THE STANDARD MODEL

Consider an “**exchange economy**” *without firms and without production*

- **Two goods**, 1 and 2
- **M consumers** of each of **two types**, 1 and 2
- Each **consumer of type** $c \in \{1,2\}$ **begins with an allocation** $\omega^c \in \mathfrak{R}_+^2$ (his endowment) and solves a utility maximization problem given a price vector $p \in \mathfrak{R}_+^2$, which defines his “**offer curve**”,

$$x^c(p) \in \arg \max_{x \in B(p, p \cdot \omega^c)} u_c(x)$$


- Any **feasible allocation** satisfies $x^1 + x^2 = \omega^1 + \omega^2$

This two-consumer two-good exchange economy can be represented graphically using a “**Edgeworth box**” (sometimes also referred to as “Edgeworth-Bowley Diagram”).


EDGEWORTH BOX

Consider **one consumer of each type**, Ms. 1 and Mr. 2


Any allocation of the **totally available quantities** $\bar{\omega}_i = \omega_i^1 + \omega_i^2$ of good i can be represented as a point in the Edgeworth box




THERE MAY BE GAINS FROM TRADE




PARETO-OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS AND CONTRACT CURVE




BUDGET LINE AND BUDGET SETS




THE SLOPE OF THE BUDGET LINE IS $(- p_1/p_2)$



THE **OFFER CURVE** DESCRIBES THE OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION CHOICE AS A FUNCTION OF MARKET PRICES



IN A WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM THE OFFER CURVES INTERSECT



EXAMPLE: EXCHANGE WITH COBB-DOUGLAS UTILITIES Compute the Walrasian Equilibrium

Consider **two consumers**, 1 and 2, with **Cobb-Douglas utility functions**

$$u_c(x_1^c, x_2^c) = (x_1^c)^\alpha (x_2^c)^{1-\alpha}$$

where $\alpha \in (0,1)$ is a constant and $c \in \{1,2\}$. The **endowment vectors** are $\omega^1 = (1,2)$ and $\omega^2 = (2,1)$ respectively

Given a price vector $p = (p_1, p_2)$, consumer 1's **utility maximization problem** can be stated (after taking the logarithm) in the form

$$x^1(p) = \arg \max_{(x_1, x_2) \in B(p, p_1 + 2p_2)} \{ \alpha \log x_1 + (1-\alpha) \log x_2 \} = \underbrace{\left(\frac{\alpha(p_1 + 2p_2)}{p_1}, \frac{(1-\alpha)(p_1 + 2p_2)}{p_2} \right)}_{\text{Consumer 1's offer curve}}$$

Similarly, we find **consumer 2's offer curve**,

$$x^2(p) = \left(\frac{\alpha(2p_1 + p_2)}{p_1}, \frac{(1-\alpha)(2p_1 + p_2)}{p_2} \right)$$

EXCHANGE WITH COBB-DOUGLAS UTILITIES (cont'd)

Using the **Demand = Supply** condition for the Walrasian equilibrium we can clear the market for good 1,

$$x_1^1(p) + x_1^2(p) = \omega_1^1 + \omega_1^2$$

or equivalently,

$$\frac{\alpha(p_1 + 2p_2)}{p_1} + \frac{\alpha(2p_1 + p_2)}{p_1} = 3$$


which yields $\frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ and $\hat{x}_1^1 = \hat{x}_2^1 = 2 - \alpha$, $\hat{x}_1^2 = \hat{x}_2^2 = 1 + \alpha$

In other words, *the price ratio in equilibrium is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods at the equilibrium allocation.*⁽¹⁾


Note also that **market clearing for good 1 implies market clearing for good 2** (why?)

(1) The marginal rate of substitution for consumer 1 between goods 1 and 2 is $MRS_{1,2}(\hat{x}^1) = \frac{\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial x_1} \Big|_{(\hat{x}_1^1, \hat{x}_2^1)}}{\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial x_2} \Big|_{(\hat{x}_1^1, \hat{x}_2^1)}} = \frac{\alpha \hat{x}_1^1}{1-\alpha \hat{x}_2^1} = \frac{\alpha (2-\alpha)}{1-\alpha (2-\alpha)} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$.


THERE MAY BE DIFFERENT WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIA Nonuniqueness



A WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM MAY NOT EXIST Example: Preferences Not Strictly Monotone



A WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM MAY NOT EXIST (cont'd) Example: Nonconvex Preferences



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ROBINSON CRUSOE ECONOMY


Robinson is alone on an island. He can *either* rest (i.e., consume leisure x_1) *or* use his own labor to pick yummy coconuts x_2

You can think of the firm “Robinson Crusoe Enterprises” producing coconuts using Robinson’s labor $z = \bar{L} - x_1$ as the only production input, i.e., the firm maximizes profits

$$\pi(w, p) = \max_{z \geq 0} \{pf(z) - wz\}$$

where $f(\cdot)$ is the firm’s *production function*,⁽¹⁾ w is the *wage* Robinson pays himself, p is the *price* of coconuts, and $\bar{L} > 0$ is a *constant*

Question: If Robinson maximizes his utility $u(x_1, x_2)$, *what is the Walrasian equilibrium of his private economy?*



(1) For simplicity assume that the production function is strictly concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable; we also assume that Robinson’s utility is smooth. In addition it is sometimes useful to add the assumptions that $f(0) = 0$ (to all for the possibility of inaction), and the so-called Inada conditions $f'(0) = \infty$, $f'(\bar{L}) = 0$ (to guarantee strict interiority of the optimizer).

ROBINSON CRUSOE ECONOMY (cont'd)

Answer: Naturally, Robinson owns all of “Robinson Crusoe Enterprises,” whence we obtain his utility maximization problem,

$$x(w, p) = \arg \max_{(x_1, x_2) \in B((p, w), I)} u(x_1, x_2)$$

where $B((w, p), I) = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathfrak{R}_+^2 : px_2 \leq w(\bar{L} - x_1) + \pi(w, p)\}$

From the definition of a **Walrasian equilibrium**, we obtain the following conditions:


- **Profit maximization:** $f'(z^*(w, p)) = \frac{w}{p}$
- **Utility Maximization:** $\left[\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1} - \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2} \right] (x_1^*, \frac{w}{p}(\bar{L} - x_1^*) + y^*(w, p) - \frac{w}{p}z^*(w, p)) = 0$

where $y^*(w, p) = f(z^*(w, p))$ is the **equilibrium production quantity of coconuts**


- **Demand = Supply:** $x_1^* = \bar{L} - z^*$
 $x_2^* = y^*$

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ROBINSON CRUSOE ECONOMY (cont'd) Production Problem



ROBINSON CRUSOE ECONOMY (cont'd) Walrasian Equilibrium



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2X2 PRODUCTION ECONOMY

Consider now a simple **two-input two-output production economy**:

- **2 Outputs**, $j \in \{1,2\}$: there are **2N firms** producing one output each ⁽¹⁾
- **2 Inputs**, capital K^j and labor L^j
- The **production function** of each firm for output j is given by

$$y^j = f^j(K^j, L^j)$$

where $f^j(0,0) = 0$ (**possibility of inaction**) and f^j is strictly concave

- **N consumers** of each of two types, $c \in \{1,2\}$, with increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility functions $u_c(x_1^c, x_2^c)$, where x_j^c is the amount a consumer of type c consumes of product j
- We assume for simplicity that **consumers do not want to consume either capital or labor**
- **Consumers start with zero endowments** in the production goods $j \in \{1,2\}$ and with \bar{K}_c units of capital and \bar{L}_c units of labor. In addition, each consumer of type c owns the fraction θ_j^c of the outstanding shares in the firms producing output j

(1) More precisely, we assume that there are N firms producing output 1 and N firms producing output 2.

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2X2 PRODUCTION ECONOMY (cont'd)

Definition: A **symmetric allocation** is one in which *all consumers of type c receive the same consumption vector $x^c = (x_1^c, x_2^c)$ and all firms of type j produce the same output level y^j using the same input vector (K^j, L^j) .*

A **symmetric allocation** $((x^1, x^2), (y^1, K^1, L^1), (y^2, K^2, L^2))$ is **feasible**, if **demand = supply**, i.e.,

$$y^j = x_j^1 + x_j^2 \quad (1)$$

$$\bar{K}_c = K_c^1 + K_c^2 \quad (2)$$

$$K^j = K_1^j + K_2^j \quad (3)$$

$$\bar{L}_c = L_c^1 + L_c^2 \quad (4)$$

$$L^j = L_1^j + L_2^j \quad (5)$$

$$y^j = f^j(K^j, L^j) \quad (6)$$

Let F be the set of feasible allocations.

2X2 PRODUCTION ECONOMY (cont'd)

Definition: A **symmetric Walrasian equilibrium** is a specification of a price p_j for each output j , a price r of capital, a wage w for labor, a consumption vector \hat{x}^c for each consumer type c , and a production vector $(\hat{y}^j, \hat{K}^j, \hat{L}^j)$ for each type of firm, such that the following three conditions are satisfied.

- **Utility maximization** $\hat{x}^c = \arg \max_{x \in B_c} \{u_c(x)\}$

$$B_c = \{(x_1^c, x_2^c) \in \mathfrak{R}_+^2 : p_1 x_1^c + p_2 x_2^c \leq r \bar{K}_c + w \bar{L}_c + \theta_1^c \pi_1 + \theta_2^c \pi_2\}$$

- **Profit maximization** $(\hat{y}^j, \hat{K}^j, \hat{L}^j) = \arg \max_{y^j = f^j(K, L)} \{p_j y^j - r K^j - w L^j\}$

- **Demand = supply**, i.e., $((\hat{x}^1, \hat{x}^2), (\hat{y}^1, \hat{K}^1, \hat{L}^1), (\hat{y}^2, \hat{K}^2, \hat{L}^2))$ is a **symmetric feasible allocation** for each $j \in \{1, 2\}$, where

$$\pi_j = p \hat{y}^j - r \hat{K}^j - w \hat{L}^j$$

is firm j 's equilibrium profit

2X2 PRODUCTION ECONOMY (cont'd)

First-order necessary optimality conditions hold in a symmetric WE:

- **Utility maximization**
$$\frac{\partial u_1(\hat{x}^1) / \partial x_1^1}{\partial u_1(\hat{x}^1) / \partial x_2^1} = \frac{\partial u_2(\hat{x}^2) / \partial x_1^2}{\partial u_2(\hat{x}^2) / \partial x_2^2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2} \quad (7)$$

- **Profit maximization**
$$p_1 \frac{\partial f^1(\hat{K}^1, \hat{L}^1)}{\partial K^1} = p_2 \frac{\partial f^2(\hat{K}^2, \hat{L}^2)}{\partial K^2} = r \quad (8)$$

$$p_1 \frac{\partial f^1(\hat{K}^1, \hat{L}^1)}{\partial L^1} = p_2 \frac{\partial f^2(\hat{K}^2, \hat{L}^2)}{\partial L^2} = w \quad (9)$$

From (7)—(9) we obtain

$$\frac{\partial u_c(\hat{x}^c) / \partial x_1^c}{\partial u_c(\hat{x}^c) / \partial x_2^c} = \frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{\partial f^2(\hat{K}^2, \hat{L}^2) / \partial K^2}{\partial f^1(\hat{K}^1, \hat{L}^1) / \partial K^1} = \frac{\partial f^2(\hat{K}^2, \hat{L}^2) / \partial L^2}{\partial f^1(\hat{K}^1, \hat{L}^1) / \partial L^1}$$

All marginal rates of substitution are determined by the equilibrium price ratio of the traded market commodities.

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Production Economies

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KEY CONCEPTS TO REMEMBER

- **Edgeworth Box**
- **Pareto Optimality**
- **Budget Line**
- **Endowment**
- **Numeraire Good**
- **Offer Curve**
- **Walrasian Equilibrium (Competitive Equilibrium) (w/ or w/o transfers)**
- **Pareto Set**
- **Contract Curve/Core**
- **Pure Exchange / Production Economy**
- **Private Ownership Economy**
- **Price-Taking Behavior**
- **Walras' Law**